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Introduction
While only few economists foresaw the economic
and financial crisis that started with the problems in
the sub-prime mortgage market in the United
States, even fewer predicted Europe’s sovereign debt
crisis. Since the start of  Europe’s Economic and
Monetary Union (EMU) interest rate differentials
on euro-area sovereign debt have been very small,
and they remained small even after many violations
of  the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). However,
the debt crisis has shown that financial markets and
politicians alike have collectively stuck their heads
in the sand. Financial markets thought that public
debt was riskless, which turned out to be blatantly
wrong, despite the fact that other countries provid-
ed bail-out funds to countries in trouble. Politicians
treated the SGP as a collective enemy, rather than
taking ownership of  the constraints that it imposes.
While the consequences were manageable as long as
the rest of  the world economy was in good shape,
this was no longer the case after the eruption of  the
financial crisis in the United States. Weaknesses in
Europe’s macro-fiscal framework were exposed and
extreme turmoil took hold of  financial markets.
The idea that a collective bail-out would eliminate
the unrest was a severe miscalculation. The scale of
the crisis was too large, while the underlying sources
of  the problems cannot be addressed through bail
outs. The events have also taught us that budgetary
discipline in the public sector is not sufficient to
rule out a sovereign debt crisis. For example, while
the Irish government followed an austere budgetary
policy the country was not immune to the crisis,
because its government was forced to bail out its
financial sector.
The European Council, the European Parliament
and the European Commission have also responded
to the crisis with a full package of  measures to
improve the macro-budgetary governance of  the EU.
A few years ago it would have been hard to imagine
EU governments being prepared to relinquish such a
large share of  their sovereign powers. It nevertheless
remains to be seen whether the measures will be suf-
ficient.
Essentially four sets of  measures have been taken.
A first set of  arrangements was introduced to calm
down financial markets. A second set of  measures
is aimed at avoiding future budgetary crisis, thereby
ensuring long-run budgetary discipline in the EU.
The third package of  measures recognizes the inter-
linkages between the health of  the private sector,
and in particular the financial sector, and the pub-
lic budget, because the government may be forced
to bail out private sector institutions during a crisis.
Finally, a fourth set of  measures is aimed at
enhancing the growth potential of  European
economies through structural economic reforms. In
this paper we critically review the various adjust-
ments that have been introduced to the EU macro-
fiscal framework. As always, any measures that lack
sufficient ownership at the national level are
doomed to fail. Hence, the public’s and the govern-
ments’ willingness to adhere to the rules is crucial.
Moral hazard remains the Achilles heel of  most of
the new arrangements. Finally, in some instances
Europe’s new rules may work out in rather bizarre
ways.
The remainder of this paper is as follows. In the sec-
ond section we summarize the history of events lead-
ing up to the current crisis. The third section reviews
the measures that have been taken to date, while the
fourth section argues that closer budgetary monitor-
ing needs to be introduced, and shown to work, before
further steps towards fiscal centralization can be
introduced.
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A brief history of events leading up to Europe’s debt
crisis
Many have been surprised how a relatively manage-
able problem, Greece’s budgetary crisis, could get so
out of hand that it threatens the existence of the entire
eurozone. In 2004, Greece admitted to having entered
the eurozone on the basis of the wrong budgetary fig-
ures. About five years later, at an ECOFIN meeting in
April 2009, its finance minister refused to clarify the
country’s financial situation, after which his col-
leagues asked for further explanation, which they got
in July 2009 from Euro commissioner Almunia in a
document that foresaw a deficit for that year of
around 5 to 6 percent of GDP instead of the 3.7 per-
cent of GDP predicted earlier. The new figure was
also based on incomplete data and there were con-
cerns that the eventual figure would be much higher.
After its election, the new socialist government led by
Papandreou predicted a 12.5 percent deficit in Oc -
tober. The new government’s admission ignited a
process of slowly increasing unrest in the bond mar-
kets that first only affected Greece’s public debt, but
later spilled over to other countries’ public debt. The
interest rate on Greece’s debt steadily rose, despite
repeated announcements of further austerity mea-
sures. In May 2010 this culminated in a first 110 bil-
lion euro assistance program financed by the Euro -
pean Union and the IMF and to be monitored the
European Commission (EC), the ECB and the IMF.
Shortly after, as other countries’ sovereign debt yields
also started to rise dangerously fast, the European
Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) was set up with a
lending capacity of 440 billion euros guaranteed by
the eurozone. This was complemented by a 60 billion
direct guarantee from the EU budget through the new
European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism
(EFSM) and a 250 billion guarantee from the IMF.
Financial markets reacted with sudden and sharp
declines in borrowing rates and the crisis was per-
ceived as being over. However, the relief  was only
short lived and interest rates soon started creeping up
further. In particular, the ‘Deauville Pact’ of October
2010, in which Merkel dropped her demand for auto-
matic sanctions for SGP sinners in return for France’s
support for ‘haircuts’ on bondholders, generated sub-
stantial financial market turmoil. In July 2011 a sec-
ond 109 billion official rescue package for Greece was
agreed. In the meantime, however, Ireland and
Portugal had been forced to accept rescue packages.
The July 2011 package for Greece foresaw a contribu-
tion by the financial sector, as well as an expansion of
the powers of the EFSF. In particular, the EFSF
would be allowed to finance the recapitalization of
financial institutions through loans to governments,
also in non-program countries, and it would be able to
intervene directly in secondary bond markets on the
basis of the analysis by the ECB. However, the initial
hope that accompanied the July 2011 package faded
fast, as it became clear that a quick ratification was
not feasible. This gave way to a hot summer in which
Italian and Spanish public debt also came under
severe pressure from the financial markets.
Changes in Europe’s macro-fiscal arrangements
The failure of EU governments to calm financial mar-
kets has led them to introduce substantial adjust-
ments to Europe’s macro-economic and budgetary
framework. Some changes are intended to deal with
crises, while others are aimed at ensuring long-run fis-
cal sustainability, in the hope of preventing future
crises. As far as the latter objective is concerned, a
three-pronged or maybe even four-pronged strategy is
adopted. Budgetary arrangements are strengthened
both at the European level by bolstering their enforce-
ment, and at the national level. Other measures recog-
nize the potential of spill-overs of financial sector
imbalances to the public budget. Such spill-overs can
be substantial and dangerous, as recent experiences
with Spain and Ireland have shown. The last set of
measures aims at strengthening the structure of the
economies, thereby fostering long-run growth.
Urgency measures in response to the crisis
The European Council of 24–25 March 2011 agreed
on the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) as the
permanent crisis mechanism to replace the EFSF and
the EFSM. The ESM is aimed at safeguarding the
financial stability of the eurozone and was originally
foreseen to come into force by mid-2013. However,
under pressure from the crisis, this date is likely to be
brought forward to July 2012, while the EFSF and the
ESM will continue to co-exist until the loans made
under the EFSF have all expired. The basis for the
ESM is an addition to Article 136 of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU): “the
Member States whose currency is the euro may estab-
lish a stability mechanism to be activated if  indispens-
able to safeguard the stability of the euro area as a
whole. The granting of any required financial assis-
tance under the mechanism will be made subject to
strict conditionality”. Financial assistance is sup-
posed to be provided only under a macro-economic
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adjustment programme and a thorough analysis of
the sustainability of the public debt, conducted by the
Commission together with the IMF and in liaison
with the ECB. If  a macro-economic adjustment pro-
gramme cannot realistically restore public debt to a
sustainable path, the member state concerned needs
to negotiate with its creditors to secure their involve-
ment in restoring debt sustainability before financial
assistance is granted.
The question remains as to how credible the ‘strict
conditionality’ clause is. As was the case with the
SGP, the main weakness of the ESM is that the
Ministers of Finance of the eurozone, who form the
Board of Governors, take the decisions on whether to
grant financial assistance and regarding the terms and
conditions of such assistance. This is also where the
SGP failed. Politicians find it difficult to deny help to
each other and may succumb to public pressure.
Knowing that this may happen, moral hazard may
easily take hold of countries with a weak discipline
culture. This is more than just an ‘academic possibili-
ty’. The EU has been rife with moral hazard on the
side of both borrowers and lenders. Before the current
crisis, heavy borrowers may still have been uncertain
about receiving a bail-out if  they got into financial
trouble.1 Now, a rescue mechanism has been institu-
tionalised and the aforementioned uncertainty about
a bail-out has been reduced even further. Hence, it is
realistic to assume that the danger of moral hazard
has become even more serious than before the crisis.
The first signs of this danger have already become vis-
ible. Despite agreements on raising tax collection and
privatisation of public enterprises in return for finan-
cial help, Greece has made hardly any progress in this
direction.
Measures to strengthen fiscal discipline
The EU has recently introduced a substantial amount
of legislation to strengthen fiscal discipline. Part of
the new legislation is contained in the European
Commission’s ‘six-pack’, which came into force last
December. The six-pack aims at strengthening both
the preventive and corrective arm of the SGP. Within
the preventive arm it imposes a cap on annual expen-
diture growth linked to the medium growth of the
economy and it introduces the possibility of sanc-
tions, which take the form of an interest-bearing
deposit. In the corrective arm it introduces the possi-
bility of opening the Excessive Deficit Procedure
(EDP) on the basis of the debt criterion. Sanctions
will now be imposed via ‘reverse qualified majority
voting’. That is, the Commission recommendation for
a sanction will be accepted, unless a qualified majori-
ty of the countries votes against it. This change makes
it harder for countries to escape sanctions, although
the Finance Ministers can still block them. No doubt
there will be pressure on them to do so, especially
when a large country is lined up for sanctions. The
proof of the pudding will be in the eating and, hence,
it remains to be seen whether ECOFIN is really pre-
pared to impose sanctions on future fiscal sinners.
The ‘fiscal compact’, which was recently concluded at
the European Summit of 30 January 2012 and has
now been signed by 25 EU member states, comple-
ments the six-pack. The compact envisages enshrining
the European fiscal framework in national law, prefer-
ably in the constitution. Doing so would hopefully
enhance the credibility of the common fiscal frame-
work. In particular, the compact requires countries to
include a limit on their annual structural deficit of
0.5 percent of GDP. It also envisages an automatic
correction mechanism in the case of a deviation from
the rule. Finally, the compact sets a convergence path
for the public debt to its reference level in case it
exceeds 60 percent of GDP. While the compact seems
to represent a significant step forward in stimulating
discipline, the Bundesbank President criticised it
(Financial Times Deutschland, 2 February 2012) by
saying that: “the guidelines for the national fiscal rules
leave considerable room of manoeuvre and there is no
control on a European level to check if  they are real-
ly respected”. Indeed, the compact does not specify
what should happen if  the country fails to stay below
the structural deficit limit, nor does it specify the pre-
cise form of the correction mechanism when a devia-
tion occurs. Presumably, this is left to the choice of the
country concerned. Furthermore, imposing a rule on
an object that is not directly observable, the structur-
al deficit, may leave some room for countries to wrig-
gle out of the necessary adjustment needed to comply
with the rule.
The six-pack also imposes minimum requirements on
national budgetary frameworks intended to cover all
levels of government. The requirements take the form
of a Directive that governments have to implement in
national legislation. EU member states have to install
numerical fiscal rules to promote compliance with the
reference values for public deficits and debt. They also
need to establish medium-term budgetary frameworks
1 Although financial markets hardly discriminated against such bor-
rowers, probably believing that the no-bail-out clause would some-
how be circumvented if  necessary.
(MTBFs) that allow for a fiscal
planning horizon of at least three
years. Multi-annual objectives
for general government deficit
and debt consistent with the
numerical fiscal rules and projec-
tions of major spending and rev-
enue items of the general govern-
ment based on unchanged poli-
cies should be included in the
MTBFs. The MTBF forms the
basis for the preparation of the
annual budget.
There is a rather substantial body
of literature on the effectiveness
of self-imposed fiscal rules, and
particularly on the balanced-
budget rules that virtually all
states in the United States have
imposed upon themselves. While US fiscal arrange-
ments differ in many respects from Europe’s, experi-
ence with the sub-national rules in the United States
may be instructive for a proper design of fiscal
arrangements at the national level in Europe. The per-
formance of the state-level rules differs widely across
the US states. Rules are more likely to be binding if
they are enshrined in the constitution than in sec-
ondary legislation. In their now classic paper, Bohn
and Inman (1996) conclude that for self-imposed rules
to be effective, they should be enforced by an inde-
pendent supreme court capable of imposing serious
penalties. The national legal status of the numerical
rules and MTBFs may differ across countries, yet the
Directive does not specify details about monitoring
and enforcement of the rules. Hence, there is a danger
that these national arrangements will ultimately have
less bite than anticipated.
Properly designed national fiscal arrangements can be
an effective way of enforcing fiscal discipline. The rea-
son for this is that the countries themselves are
responsible for the design and adoption of their own
arrangements and, hence, are likely to feel more
responsibility for meeting the requirements imposed
by these arrangements than for complying with
restrictions ‘imposed by Europe’. Indeed, several
authors have shown that well-designed national bud-
getary arrangements are conducive to fiscal discipline.
Debrun et al. (2008) explore the effects of national fis-
cal rules on fiscal policymaking. They construct a fis-
cal rule index that increases in its strength and cover-
age. The strength of a rule is larger if  the legal base of
the rule is stronger, the body in charge of monitoring
and enforcement is more independent, the enforce-
ment mechanism is stronger and media visibility is
higher. Coverage refers to the share of the general
government balance covered. The authors show that a
higher value of the fiscal rules index is associated with
a lower cyclically-adjusted primary deficit.
Well-designed national fiscal institutions may also
lead to more reliable fiscal figures, which, in turn,
would be conducive to avoiding turbulence in sover-
eign bond markets. Table 1, which is extracted from
Beetsma et al. (2011), reports the average deviations
of  the budget balance, revenues and expenditures in
percent of  GDP for 14 EU members over the period
1998–2008 or 1999–2008 in the (1) the ‘nowcast’, i.e.
the current-year forecast for year t made at the end
of  year t, from the plan for year t made at the end of
year t-1, (2) the eventual ‘ex-post’ figure for year t
from the nowcast, and (3) the eventual figure from
the plan. All data are taken from the Stability and
Convergence Programs that countries have to submit
to the European Commission. Clearly, planned bud-
get balances are overly optimistic on average in
terms of  the nowcast figures, which, in turn, tend to
be overly optimistic in terms of  the ex-post figures.
Relative to these ex-post figures, planned balances
fall short by 0.5 percent of  GDP on average. While
the over optimism of  the planning stage relative to
the nowcast stage is driven by spending being higher
than planned, over optimism at the nowcast stage is
driven by an exaggeration of  the eventual revenue
figures.
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Table 1  
Average errors 
 Nowcast minus 
plan 
(1) 
Ex post minus 
nowcast 
(2) 
Ex post minus 
plan 
(3) 
BAL – 0.17* 
(0.10) 
– 0.34*** 
(0.11) 
– 0.50*** 
(0.17) 
REV 0.02 
(0.12) 
– 0.60*** 
(0.18) 
– 0.59*** 
(0.21) 
EXP 0.19 
(0.12) 
– 0.26 
(0.16) 
– 0.09 
(0.18) 
Notes: The average errors are all expressed in percent of GDP with 
standard errors (corrected for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation) 
reported underneath. Further, * = significance at the 10% level; ** = 
significance at the 5% level; *** = significance at the 1% level. 
Abbreviations: BAL = Budget balance/GDP; REV = Revenue/GDP and 
EXP = Expenditure/GDP. The sample period is 1999-2008 for columns 
(1) and (3) and 1998-2008 for column (2). 
Source: Beetsma et al. (2011). 
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Beetsma et al. (2009) and Beetsma et al. (2011)
explore the sources of the over optimism at the plan-
ning and the nowcast stage. However, better national
fiscal institutions, whether measured through a higher
fiscal rule index (defined as in Debrun et al., 2008), a
higher MTBF index or a higher transparency index,2
reduce the optimism bias at both the planning and the
nowcast stage. Hence, better fiscal institutions seem to
be conducive to making real-time fiscal figures more
reliable. In a detailed study of  the Netherlands,
Beetsma et al. (2010) explore what suitable budgeting
institutions at the national level might look like. While
not perfect, the so-called regime of ‘trend-based bud-
geting’ since 1994 has worked quite well for the
Netherlands. This regime was characterised by expen-
diture ceilings, cautious budgeting and a strict separa-
tion between the expenditure and revenue side of the
budget, restricting the use of revenue windfalls for
extra expenditure. Unfortunately, the practice of
using cautious growth projections was abandoned
during the last Balkenende cabinet.
Ruling out (excessive) macro-economic imbalances
The debt crisis has shown that fiscal constraints alone
are not enough to rule out budget deficits. Imbalances
in the private sector, such as large debts on the part of
households or firms, may lead to instability in the
banking sector if  outside circumstances or market
sentiments change. To prevent a systemic crisis, the
government may be forced into a bail-out of a trou-
bled bank. This happened in the case of Ireland,
which had a relatively low public debt ratio until the
start of the current crisis. However, through the forced
bail-out of the Anglo-Irish Bank and support to other
banks, Ireland saw its public debt ratio in 2010 shoot
up by almost 35 percent to around 100 percent. As a
result, Ireland became the first country to receive sup-
port from the EFSF and the EFSM.
Recognizing the link between private sector develop-
ments and the public budget, the six-pack also con-
tains a regulation to prevent imbalances, as well as a
regulation to enforce a reduction of excessive imbal-
ances once they have arisen. Imbalances indicate
macro-economic developments with the potential to
adversely affect the country concerned or its EU part-
ner countries. The first regulation provides the basis
for an early warning system, which consists of an alert
system with a scoreboard based on a set of macro-
economic and macro-financial indicators. The early
warning system envisages preventive action before
imbalances become too large. The second regulation
referred to as the Excessive Imbalances Procedure
(EIP) allows for enforcement through the potential
use of financial sanctions.
Obviously, this part of the six-pack can only be an
imperfect answer to the emergence of (excessive)
imbalances. The aforementioned indicators cannot
perfectly determine whether imbalances exist nor
whether they are harmful. For example, a substantial
current account deficit may be justified if  the country
under consideration is relatively undeveloped, but has
good growth prospects. More importantly, large cur-
rent account surpluses may also be deemed harmful
and require correction. However, it is crucial to con-
sider the source of such surpluses. If  they arise be -
cause the country has acquired a competitive edge
through clever structural policies, a good educational
system and wage restraint, then this can hardly be
blamed on the country. Forcing countries to give up
those policies would go against the principle of fol-
lowing best practices. If  we think of Northern Europe
as running current account surpluses and Southern
Europe as running current account deficits, it is in any
case very doubtful that punishing the former group
would solve the imbalances problem (see also Gradus
and Beetsma 2012). One reason is that both blocks
also trade with other countries within the EU and
outside the EU. More importantly, it denies the fact
that the source of Southern Europe’s current account
deficits is its lack of competitiveness (partly) due to
poorly-functioning labour and product markets. A
first-best policy would be to exert enforcement on
countries for following the wrong policies leading to
imbalances. Here, one should not only think of
reforms of labor and product markets, but also of reg-
ulation and supervision of the financial sector as long
as this remains a national competence. In addition, a
more activating welfare system will reduce public
spending and is conducive to labor force partici -
pation. 
Structural reforms imposed at the EU-level
Structural reforms are necessary to unleash Southern
Europe’s growth potential. This will also make it eas-
ier to achieve fiscal sustainability. To bolster the mem-
ber states’ economic structures, the EU countries
2 An MTBF in Beetsma et al. (2009) and Beetsma et al. (2011) is
defined as an institutional device to extend the horizon for fiscal pol-
icymaking beyond the annual budgetary calendar. The index mea-
sures the institutional strength of the framework and is increasing in
the connectedness between the multi-annual targets and the annual
budgets, the involvement of the parliament, the existence of a coor-
dination mechanism and the degree of monitoring and enforcement.
The ‘six-pack’ also requires member states to publish information on
contingent liabilities with large impacts on the public budgets.
agreed on the so-called ‘Euro Plus Pact’ at the
European Council of 24 and 25 March 2011. Among
other things the pact specifically requires member
states to undertake all measures that are necessary to
foster competitiveness and employment. The former
will be assessed on the basis of wage and productivity
developments. The needs for adjustment will be
explored with particular attention to wage setting
arrangements, the degree of centralization in bargain-
ing and wage indexation mechanisms. The latter is
assessed on long-term and youth unemployment and
labour participation rates, which is arguably the coun-
try’s most important statistic in this regard. Un -
fortunately, the Euro Plus Pact lacks an enforcement
mechanism, even though the consequences of a lack
of reform may spill across borders if  countries need to
make use of the EU’s financial rescue mechanisms.
How to proceed?
To ensure the long-run existence of Europe’s common
currency some form of further fiscal centralization is
unavoidable. The current arrangements have proven
to be unworkable. In particular, they have proven to
be a recipe for moral hazard, while the greatest sinners
in budgetary terms have failed to take responsibility
for their policies, thereby undermining the function-
ing of the common currency. However, fiscal centrali-
sation means different things to different people.
One view is that it calls for the introduction of Euro -
bonds (‘stability bonds’ in European Commission lan-
guage) or the enlargement of Europe’s emergency
funds. As far as stability bonds are concerned, the
Commission (2011) has issued a green paper in which
it sets out the rationale and conditions for issuing
such bonds. Issuance would be pooled across member
states and, in its most far-reaching form countries,
would share in the revenue flows and debt-servicing
costs. 
The Commission mentions a number of advantages
of stability bonds. In particular, financial market
pressure on the countries currently in trouble would
be alleviated, while risks of sudden liquidity dry-ups
would be reduced. Risks to the banking system would
also be reduced because the value of those bonds
would fluctuate less than that of individual country
sovereign debts and because the home bias in sover-
eign debt holdings would be reduced (lowering the
exposure of banks to domestic assets). Liquidity pre-
miums would fall and the transmission of monetary
policy would be facilitated through the creation of a
larger pool of safe and liquid assets. Finally, the larg-
er issuance volumes and higher liquidity of the sec-
ondary markets would strengthen the position of the
euro as an international reserve currency.
The main drawback of stability bonds, in particular
under the assumption of  joint and several guaran-
tees, as is also recognized by the Commission, is that
they may stimulate moral hazard. The effects of  fis-
cal profligacy at the national level on the common
debt yield will be diluted, providing a disincentive to
austerity in all countries in the system. Hence, the
Commission argues that the introduction of  stability
bonds would need to be accompanied by reinforced
fiscal surveillance and policy coordination. Such
coordination must also extend to avoiding and cor-
recting harmful macroeconomic imbalances due to
their potential spill-overs to the public finances.
However, experience suggests that it will not be easy
to avoid additional moral hazard through intensified
monitoring. Given that countries that currently pay a
low interest rate on their public debt might experi-
ence a disadvantage from the introduction of  stabili-
ty bonds, the Commission suggests redistributing
some of the net benefit from high-yield countries to
low-yield countries. This would also reduce moral
hazard according to the Commission. To us it is
unclear, however, how such a redistribution of  the
benefits from stability bonds could ameliorate the
problem of moral hazard. Moreover, it creates scope
for a largely political discussion about redistribution,
which creates new inefficiencies and moral hazard
problems too.
In our view, fiscal centralisation should start with
much closer monitoring by EU institutions, and par-
ticularly by the European Commission, of the bud-
geting processes in the eurozone member states. If  the
process threatens to derail, the EU should have the
option of intervening or taking over the budgeting
process. This type of fiscal centralisation will be need-
ed to internalize the growing spill-over effects of fiscal
decisions at the national level. In effect, these spill-
overs create a ‘soft budget constraint’ at the national
level, because the consequences in terms of financial
market turbulence of a debt default in a member state
are too severe for the ECB and the rest of the EU not
to come to the rescue of the state under financial
threat. Fiscal centralisation through closer monitor-
ing of budgeting would need to be accompanied by
more centralised supervision of the financial sector.
The latter is needed to avoid regulatory capture and
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the associated excessive risk taking leading to harmful
cross-border spill-overs.
Only once the hurdle of tighter budgetary monitoring
has been taken and shown to work properly for a
number of years, does it make sense to consider fur-
ther centralisation through the introduction of
Eurobonds, or an enlargement of Europe’s emergency
funds. The run-up to the current crisis can teach valu-
able lessons in this regard that tend to be too easily
forgotten during the crisis itself. Further fiscal cen-
tralization requires a sincere and strong commitment
to fiscal discipline. If  countries are unwilling to relin-
quish some of their sovereign powers to pave the way
for tighter fiscal monitoring, one must question their
commitment to discipline.
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